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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. SAMARA BROS., INC.;1 IS THE
EXPANSION OF TRADE DRESS LAW FAR ENOUGH?

I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that one may copy their competitor’s trade dress without crossing
the infringement line is a hot legal topic, creating a rivalry between brand
name manufacturers and private label imitators as well as brand name
companies and brand name competition. However, decisions in the Supreme
Court and lower courts have led to confusing and unclear guidelines in
determining when one infringes on trade dress law. Determining these
standards aptly has been called “one of the most difficult analytical issues in all
of trade dress law.”2
First, the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Two Pesos clarified that trade
dress will not cause infringement if it is inherently distinctive.3 However, the
Court failed to adopt a standard to determine when trade dress is inherently
distinctive. This led to a variety of tests to be created by the lower circuits and
a spectrum of differing opinions. Next, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros, Inc., the Supreme Court decided product packaging can be inherently
distinctive, but product design is never inherently distinctive.4 Even though
the Supreme Court set forth these clear guidelines it again failed to specify a
test to determine the meaning of inherently distinctive, nor a bright line
difference between product design and product packaging.5
This article first provides an overview of the development of trademark
law and the expansion of the trade dress doctrine. Next, the article presents the
various tests fashioned by the lower courts to determine what exactly makes
trade dress inherently distinctive. Finally, this article analyzes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores.6 The last section concludes by glancing
at whether the Wal-Mart decision is applicable to the ever-changing
technology of the Internet.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
417
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Traditional Trademark Law

United States trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act,7 is an exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause. The purpose of the Act is to “secure to the owner of a mark the
goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers.”8 The Act also seeks to make “actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks and to protect persons engaged in
commerce against unfair competition.”9 While section 32 of the Lanham Act10
protects registered marks, section 43(a)11 protects qualifying unregistered
trademarks. Thus section 43(a)12 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action
against a defendant who uses an unregistered trademark that causes a
likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source, sponsorship, or
approval of its goods.13
A trademark is defined as “any work, name, symbol or device, or any
combination thereof used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product from those manufactured or sold by others
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”14 Marks
may be classified in the following categories of increasing distinctiveness:
generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.15 These are often known
as the “Abercrombie factors.”16 Marks that are deemed suggestive, arbitrary or
fanciful are entitled to trademark protection because their “intrinsic natures
serves to identify a particular source of a product.”17 Further, it is argued that
trademark protection should be afforded to suggestive or distinctive terms
which shed light upon the qualities or characteristics of goods, but which are
not descriptive of such goods in that “an effort of the imagination on the part of
the observer” would be required to know their nature.18

7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998).
8. Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1995).
9. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S at 767-768 (citing Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1998)).
10. 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1998).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
12. Id.
13. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); for example a commonly known mark is “Nike”, and symbol
marks, such as Nike’s “swoosh” symbol.
15. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
16. Id.
17. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768.
18. General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940).
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In comparison, generic marks are those that refer to “the genus of which
the particular product is a species.”19 Examples of generic terms include
“aspirin” and “thermos.”20 These marks are not protectable as trademarks
because the number of such appropriate terms is limited and all merchants
should be equally allowed to use such terms to describe their own goods when
competing for customers.21
Lastly, marks that serve only a descriptive function in relation to a product
may be protectable under trademark law as inherently distinctive.22 A
descriptive term identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service
such a color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients.23 Over time, a
descriptive mark may acquire distinctiveness that allows it to be protected
under section 2(f) of the Lanham Act.24 This type of acquired distinctiveness
is called secondary meaning.25 Secondary meaning is established when a
manufacturer shows that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance
of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.26
B.

Trade Dress Law

Trade dress can be registered as a trademark with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) if the trade dress is: 1) inherently distinctive or
has acquired secondary meaning; and 2) is non-functional.27 While trade dress
protection is not expressly set forth in the Lanham Act, it has evolved and been
recognized through the development of case law.28 Trade dress involves the
total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or
color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.29 It
refers to the appearance of a product when that appearance is used to identify
the producer.30 Historically, trade dress referred only to the product packaging

19. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9.
20. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
21. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
22. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
23. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998).
25. See Rohit A. Sabnis, Product Configuration Trade Dress and Abercrombie: Analysis of
Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 183, n.36
(2000).
26. Id.
27. Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986)
28. See David K. Hou, Protecting Internet Trade Dress: What to do about Product
Configuration?, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5 (1999).
29. John Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1883).
30. Publications International, Ltd. v Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998).
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and labeling, but recently courts have expanded the term to include the total
design of a product.31
Some examples of trade dress held to be protectable include the festive
décor of a restaurant,32 the shape of a Coca-Cola bottle33 and the shape of a
book.34 There are two distinguishable categories of trade dress, product
packaging and product configuration.35 Product packaging trade dress includes
the total image created by the actual packaging in which a product is
marketed.36 This is conceptually separable from the actual product.37
However, product configuration trade dress encompasses the design or
particular feature of the product, but the design is not separable from the
product.38 Rather, it is part of the product itself.39
Like trademarks, trade dress is capable of being distinctive and capable of
being protected under the Lanham Act if it is either inherently distinctive or
has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.40 Furthermore, the
trade dress has to be non-functional.41 This functionality requirement prevents
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting the goodwill
of a source, from inhibiting competition by granting exclusive rights to a
functional product feature.42 The aesthetic functionality doctrine further seeks
to protect competition by recognizing that in some instances non-useful or
decorative product features should be denied trade dress protection.43 Courts
have recognized that in some cases, competitors need to copy strictly
decorative product features in order to compete effectively.44 The Second
Circuit has held that when a decorative or ornamental feature “is claimed as a
trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by
limiting the range of adequate alternatives, the aesthetic functionality doctrine
denies such protection.”45

31. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir.
1999).
32. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
33. United States Trademark Reg. No. 696,147 (issued Aug. 2, 1960).
34. Harlequin Enters, Ltd. v. Gulf Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981).
35. See Margaret Barett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configuration and the Federal
Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 475 n.15 (1998).
36. Id. at 475.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769-70.
41. Id. at 769.
42. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
43. Sabnis, supra note 25, at 189.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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While case law has covered the broad concept of trade dress, there are two
important issues that still need to be addressed by the courts. First, it is still
questionable under which circumstance the features or design of a product are
properly considered inherently distinctive. Secondly, it is unclear what is the
difference between product design and product packaging. The Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Two Pesos and Wal-Mart have shed some light on
these issues, while also creating confusion among lower courts struggling to
answer these questions using the standards set out by the Supreme Court.46
III. THE SUPREME COURT: TWO PESOS
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split among the Court of Appeals on the question of
whether trade dress that is inherently distinctive and therefore protectable
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act even though showing that it has
acquired secondary meaning is lacking.47
In 1987, Taco Cabana, a mexican restaurant chain, sued Two Pesos, a rival
chain, claiming that Two Pesos deliberately copied Taco Cabana décor.48 Taco
Cabana argued that the restaurant’s trade dress, a combination of nonfunctional
features such as bright festive colors and distinctive roof design, created a
distinctive total image for its restaurant chain.49 As a result of the distinctive
image, Taco Cabana claimed it was entitled trademark protection under the
Lanham Act.50 The trial court agreed and held that trade dress may include the
shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying
sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the décor, the menu, the equipment used to
serve the food, the server’s uniforms and other features reflecting on the total
image of the restaurant.51 The jury found that Two Pesos “intentionally and
deliberately” infringed Taco Cabana’s trade dress and awarded Taco Cabana
millions of dollars in damages.52
On appeal, Two Pesos argued that trade dress was not capable of being
inherently distinctive.53 Therefore, Taco Cabana should have been required to
prove that the restaurant’s décor had acquired secondary meaning.54 Prior to
the Two Pesos decision some courts of appeal held that trade dress was not
capable of being inherently distinctive, and secondary meaning must be proved

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339.
505 U.S. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 764.
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
Id. at 766.
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in order to afford protection.55 The Court, in an unanimous decision, held
“trade dress that is inherently distinctive is protectable under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act without a showing that is had acquired secondary meaning.”56
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the majority rule followed at the time by the
Fifth,57 Seventh,58 and Eleventh Circuits59 that trade dress was capable of being
inherently distinctive.
By overruling the Second and Third Circuits, which had required a
showing of secondary meaning for protection of trade dress, the Two Pesos
Court unified the standard for trademark and trade dress law.60 As in
traditional trademark cases, a trade dress plaintiff whose product is inherently
distinctive can receive automatic protection without secondary meaning. Two
Pesos, however, did not set out a clear test as to what constitutes inherently
distinctive trade dress.
Although the Two Pesos decision clearly required secondary meaning in
addition to a showing of inherent distinctiveness for trade dress protection, it
was silent as to what constituted distinctive trade dress.61 The court
approvingly cited the traditional Abercrombie Factors, but merely assumed that
the Fifth Circuit was correct in holding the trade dress at issue was inherently
distinctive.62 Although one could imply from the Court’s application of the
Abercrombie factors that the court was approving those factors as
determinative of trade dress distinctiveness, some post-Two Pesos circuit court
decisions have held otherwise.
A.

Lower Court’s Interpretation of Two Pesos

I.P. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co, decided by the First Circuit, involved
allegations that the defendants impermissibly copied the plaintiff’s “falling
water” faucet designs.63 Lund’s faucet was designed by noted architect Arne
Jacobsen and received numerous design awards.64 Kohler admittedly copied
the design and offered the faucets for sale at a lower price.65
The First Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court that the
Abercrombie factors did not apply and that Lund’s faucet was not inherently

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Vibrant Sales Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767.
Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).
Computer Care v. Service Systems Enters. Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992).
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983).
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770.
Id. at 766-70.
Id.
I.P. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 32.
Id.
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distinctive.66 The court concluded that by rejecting the Abercrombie test as a
means of determining inherent distinctiveness in product configurations and
instead followed the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.67 The Seabrook Foods test was
“whether the design, and shape of a combination of elements is so unique,
unusual or unexpected that one can assume without proof that it will
automatically be perceived by customers as an indicator of origin – a
trademark.”68
Next, the Second Circuit applied its analysis to Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytags, Ltd.69 In this case, the Second Circuit was faced with the task of
determining “what it means for trade dress to be inherently distinctive.”70 This
case involved the copying of plaintiff’s “squirrel” and “leaf” design appliqués
on children’s sweaters.71 The court held that designs on children’s sweaters
were product features and in contrast with product packaging, should not be
analyzed for inherent distinctiveness using the Abercrombie classifications.72
In Two Pesos the court stated that they did not intend to nullify the
statutory definition of a trademark requiring “a person ‘use’ or ‘intend’ to use
the mark to identify and distinguish his/her goods. . .from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”73 The court found
that the presumption of this source identifying function given to inherently
distinctive product packaging under Abercrombie should not be extended to
product configurations because configurations are primarily aesthetic or
functional rather than source identifying.74 Furthermore, the court found that
the proper inquiry for determining inherent distinctiveness is to ask whether
product features are “likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the
product.”75 Therefore, according to the Second Circuit “a plaintiff must do
more than demonstrate that the appearance of its product serves some source
identifying function.”76 It must demonstrate that the primary purpose behind
the design was to identify its product source.77
The Third Circuit was the first to confront the issue of what constitutes
inherently distinctive trade dress after the Supreme Court’s decision in Two

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 40.
I.P. Lund, 163 F.2d at 27.
Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1008.
Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1008.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1009, n.6.
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Pesos in Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises.78 It sought to
delineate when, if ever, product configurations should be deemed inherently
distinctive.79 The case dealt with the copying of the shape and texture of a
garden planter.80 The court, like the Second Circuit in Knitwaves, found the
Abercrombie classifications inapplicable to determining inherent
distinctiveness in product configurations.81 The court stated classifications for
product features are improper because “being constitutive of the product itself
and thus having no such dialectical relationship to the product . . . they cannot
be said to be ‘suggestive’ or descriptive’ of the product, or ‘arbitrary’ or
‘fanciful’ in relation to it.”82
In declining to adopt the classifications, the court gave two reasons why
they should not applied to product configuration trade dress.83 First, it stated
product configuration bears a different relationship to the product than do
trademarks.84 Second, the court emphasized that unlike traditional trademarks,
one cannot automatically assume that product configurations will serve as a
source-identifying function.85 As a result, the new test formed by the Third
Circuit was that “the product configuration must be: (1) unusual and
memorable; (2) conceptually separable form the product; and (3) likely to
serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product.”86
Other circuits have derived their test from the Seabrook Foods test, but
have not expressly adopted it.87 While, in contrast, the Fourth and the Eighth
Circuits have expressly rejected it.88
Recently, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue of what constitutes an
inherently distinctive product configuration in Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc.
v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd.89 Ashley Furniture sued SanGiacomo for copying the
design of one of Ashley’s bedroom furniture suites.90 Applying the
Abercrombie classifications, the Fourth Circuit held that the overall appearance
of the furniture was neither arbitrary or fanciful and therefore inherently

78. 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 1440.
80. Id. at 1433.
81. Id. at 1441.
82. Id. at 1440-41.
83. Duraco Products, 40 F.3d at 1440.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1434.
87. See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 33; Knitwaves, Inc, 71 F.3d at 1008.
88. See Ashley Furniture Indus., 187 F.3d at 371; Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d
780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995).
89. 187 F.3d at 366.
90. Id.
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distinctive.91 By adopting the Abercrombie factors the court rejected the tests
fashioned by the First, Second and Third Circuits.92
Finally, the Eighth Circuit visited the Two Pesos analysis in Stuart Hall
Co. v. Ampad Co.93 The Eighth Circuit sought to determine the proper test for
determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.94 The case questioned the
manufacturing of specialized notebooks and pads that had graphics and text
copied and sold at a lower price by a competitor.95 The Stuart Hall Court
adopted the Abercrombie standards for determining inherent distinctiveness in
all types of trade dress cases.96 According to the court, Two Pesos held that
product configuration and product packaging should be treated uniformly.97
Thus, the Eighth Circuit felt the Abercrombie analysis should be applied in
both instances.98
The circuit court conflict has important implications for trade dress
protection. Some thought that Wal-Mart would have clarified the issue, but the
Supreme Court’s decision resulted in only added confusion to the area of trade
dress law.
IV. THE ISSUE OF TRADE DRESS AND INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS REVISITED
BY THE SUPREME COURT
A.

Case Description of Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc.99

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court questioned under what circumstances a
product’s design is distinctive and therefore protectable as unregistered trade
dress.100 This case involved Samara Brothers, Inc. which designs and
manufactures children’s clothing, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. who is one of the
nations best known retailers.101 Samara’s primary product lines were
spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliqués of hearts,
flowers, fruits and the like.102 A number of chain stores, including J.C. Penny,
sold this line of clothing under contract with Samara.103 During that time WalMart contracted with one of its suppliers, Judy Philippine, Inc. to manufacture

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 374.
Id. at 371.
Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 780.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 787.
Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 787.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

426

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:417

a line of children’s outfits for sale in the 1996 spring/summer season.104 WalMart then sent Judy-Philippine photographs of a number of garments from
Samara’s line.105 She made minor modifications to sixteen of Samara’s
garments, thereby producing a line of clothing for Wal-Mart, which contained
many copyrighted elements.106 In 1996, Wal-Mart briskly sold the so-called
knockoffs, generating more than $1 million in gross profits.107
However, in June of 1996, a buyer of J.C. Penny called a representative of
Samara to complain that she had seen Samara garments on sale at Wal-Mart
for a lower price than J.C. Penny was allowed to charge under its contract with
Samara.108 The Samara representative told the buyer that Samara did not
supply its clothing to Wal-Mart.109 As a result of this situation, Samara
officials investigated the circumstances and found that Wal-Mart and several
other major retailers, such as K-Mart, Hills and Goody’s, were selling
knockoffs of Samara’s outfits produced by Judy-Philippine.110 In response to
the information disclosed from the investigation, Samara sent cease and desist
letters, none of which the companies responded.111 Then Samara brought
action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York arguing most
importantly, infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.112 All of the defendants, except Wal-Mart, settled before trial.113
After a week-long trial, the jury found in favor of Samara on all claims,
awarding Samara damages, interest, costs and fees totaling almost $1.6
million, together with injunctive relief.114 Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied, and the Second
Circuit affirmed.115 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.116
The Supreme Court held in an action for infringement of unregistered trade
dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive,
and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.117 First,
the court looked at the requirement of distinctiveness. In evaluating
distinctiveness, courts have differentiated between marks that are inherently
distinctive, marks whose intrinsic nature serves to identify their particular
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
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source, and marks whose primary significance in the minds of the public is to
identify the product’s source rather than the product itself.118 The Court found
that product design, like color, is not inherently distinctive.119 With product
design, as with color, consumers are aware of the reality that, almost
invariably, that feature is intended not to identify the source, but to render the
product itself more useful or more appealing.120
In particular, the Court differentiated trade dress into two categories:
product packaging and product design.121 It emphasized that product
packaging is still capable of establishing inherent distinctiveness.122 However,
the Court drew a bright line test for product design that the plaintiff must
always prove secondary meaning.123 Two Pesos was distinguished since, in
that case, the trade dress at issue was restaurant décor, which does not
constitute product design, but rather product packaging.124 Furthermore, by
distinguishing Two Pesos, the Court realized that the decision here might force
courts to draw a difficult line between product design and product packaging
trade dress.125 However, the Court stated that difficulty would be less than the
frequency and difficulty of having to decide when a product design is
inherently distinctive.126 The Court went even further when stating “to the
extent there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of
caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring
secondary meaning.”127
B.

Author’s Analysis of Wal-Mart’s Holding.

The Wal-Mart decision only added to the current state of confusion among
the lower courts. At this time, not only does the lower court have to determine
what makes product packaging inherently distinctive; they also have to
determine the difference between product packaging and product design.
The Court made it clear that Two Pesos was only about product packaging.
As a result, the controversy in the lower courts concerning whether Two Pesos
should be applied to trade dress generally has ended. However, the Court
failed to specify the test for inherently distinctive for product packaging.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1343.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1346.
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It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court again mentioned the
Abercrombie factors.128 More specifically, the Court held that fanciful,
arbitrary and suggestive trade dresses are deemed inherently distinctive
because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product.
In this situation, the Court used the Abercrombie factors to determine what is
inherently distinctive.129 By mentioning the Abercrombie classifications the
Court seems to infer that the classifications are an appropriate test for
determining whether product packaging is inherently distinctive. However, it
would be more appropriate if the Supreme Court would draw a bright line test.
Since, the Court felt that the Abercrombie analysis is important in determining
inherently distinctive trade dress, the reasoning should have specified . Until
the Supreme Court indicates the analysis that should be used, the lower courts
will remain divided.
The Supreme Court in holding that there are two categories of trade dress,
product packaging and product design, failed to specify any criterion on which
to make that determination. The line between the two categories in not
mutually exclusive. To help resolve the issue to some extent, the Court stated
“to the extent that there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby
requiring secondary meaning.”130 However, as a result of this statement,
unless the trade dress issue is apparent that it is product packaging, courts will
always require a secondary meaning, even when one might not be necessary.
This creates an extra burden for the party claiming infringement all the time.
C. Is Wal-Mart Applicable to the World of the Internet?
The two issues mentioned above are not the only two problems that arise
out of the Wal-Mart decision. Most importantly, the decision is not applicable
to the ever-changing world of technology, more specifically commerce over
the Internet. The next section will point out in detail the inapplicability of the
decision to the Internet. The field of intellectual property is constantly
growing and evolving with the great emergence of technology. Intellectual
property is an area of law that encounters many new controversial issues, and
therefore must adapt to resolve such issues. Trade dress protects consumer
recognition of the goods and services’ source and ensures that the trade dress
owner secures the returns on her investment in building and maintaining the
goodwill associated with the trade dress.131 The individual designs, features,
and identifying characteristics of goods and services, which cyberspace
entrepreneurs offer via virtual “storefronts,” deserve similar legal protection as
128.
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their tangible counterparts in the physical world.132 Based on these purposes,
there appears to be little reason for denying Internet based trade dress the same
protection that physical goods and services’ trade dress enjoy.133 However,
some courts’ interpretations of trade dress law, if applied to Internet
“storefronts” without first accounting for the Internet’s unique qualities,
suggest that trade dress protection will not be available in cyberspace, and in
fact, may be more difficult to obtain for Internet-based products and
services.134
The fundamental objectives of trademark and trade dress law are to prevent
consumer confusion and protect source identification.135 A major challenge in
applying trade dress protection to an Internet site is the inherent variability that
exists when a viewer visits an Internet site.136 The Internet’s variability will
likely complicate the determination of whether consumers identify a product’s
source through its design. Problems arise because by its nature web sites are
always changing, and web programmers are able to change their products
overnight. Within hours a business’s Internet appearance services, or manner
of providing services can change, and within days or weeks, these aspects may
change again. The primary attraction of most Internet sites is that they are
regularly updated.137 This variation can make it difficult to determine what
constitutes the product presented to the consumer.138 The software companies
that create Internet browsers and the Internet Service Providers continue to
introduce new technology and update services every year, constantly altering
the manner in which the consumer interacts and views the Internet web sites.139
Since, the browser programs remain far from standard, one Internet site may
present a different experience to a viewer, depending on what type of browser
he or she uses. An analogy can be drawn between visiting an Internet site and
the Supreme Court’s finding in Two Pesos in which it recognized viable trade
dress protection for “a festive eating atmosphere” presented to customers in
several Mexican restaurants.140 Clearly, a restaurant visitor’s eating experience
varies with locations: individual elements of the décor may be different, the
menu may vary throughout the year, and the variations in the service of the
employees would likely affect each visit.141 Nevertheless, the Court found that

132. Id. at 1.
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the overall experience of the restaurant’s “festive atmosphere” was worthy of
protection.142 Therefore, just as the “atmosphere” of a restaurant can
incorporate the varying elements of the same overall experience to establish a
valid trade dress, an Internet site should be able to incorporate “online”
versions of these elements and create online “atmosphere” equally as deserving
of trade dress protection.143 For example, a site may offer a different selection
of items for sale at different times of the year, but the layout of each page, the
organization of the site, and the overall experience of the transaction would be
distinctive and recognizable at each separate visit.144
Another major problem is the application of the product packaging/design
distinction that was addressed by Wal-Mart. Importantly, analysis of the
distinctiveness of an Internet site may be greatly influenced by whether it is
deemed packaging or product design. This decision has a significant impact on
the application of trade dress law to the Internet. The question of whether a
particular Internet-based product, service, or Web page constitutes packaging
or design and, therefore, requiring a showing of inherent distinctiveness, will
greatly impact the availability of trade dress protection for the respective item.
Of course, it is often difficult to distinguish between a product’s packaging and
the product itself. While courts will make decisions based on the facts
presented in individual cases, the best approach would seem to be an analysis
based on the product as a whole, without an effort to separate the packaging
from the product. One useful example of extending trade dress protection to
Internet sites can be found in Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame
Straightening Equipment Inc., where the court found that the layout and
appearance of mail order catalogue was deserving of a trade dress
protection.145 By analogy just as a user of a catalogue experiences an overall
impression of using a producer’s catalogue and may rely on it as an indication
of source, so will Internet users experience and rely on particular Internet
sites.146
Unlike physical objects, the features of a Web-based product design cannot
be conceptually separated from the product packaging; the features are
inherently part of one another.147 Thus, Internet products would never give
rise to product packaging cases. Due to the decision in Wal-Mart any case that
is close, courts should require a secondary meaning. Every Internet case
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would involve product design instead of packaging, thus requiring secondary
meaning and the plaintiff to overcome a heavy burden. 148
Due to the fact that Internet sites would not be able to demonstrate
distinctiveness, in many ways, secondary meaning is at the heart of the
underlying principles of trade dress protection. Although the determination of
secondary meaning generally requires a consideration of long-term consumer
exposure to a particular product, the Internet’s variability make such
determination difficult at best. Factors cited as establishing secondary
meaning include: 1) the duration and exclusivity of the design’s use, 2) the
amount and nature of advertising that emphasizes the design and its distinctive
features, 3) consumer survey evidence linking the design to a single source,
and 4) the defendant’s intent in copying the design.149 Given the youth of the
Internet as a channel of commerce, the duration of use will likely be minimal,
exclusivity of web site features and design will also be minimal due to the
copying and imitation existing on the Internet.150 Furthermore, the Lanham
Act states that “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which
the claim of distinctiveness is made.”151 Due to the fact that web site designs
and appearances are unlikely to remain static, a requirement of five years
continuous use is clearly inappropriate for Internet trade dress protection.
Even if a company could establish that such a site has been in existence for
five years, it unlikely to currently present the same “total image” to a customer
as it did within the last two or three years.152 Most primitive Internet sites
would not be barely five years old. Once the technology of the Internet
becomes more standardized, companies may be able to rely on this statutory
provision. Until then, the case law methods of establishing secondary meaning
will likely prevail in the area of Internet trade dress.
The current state of trade dress law makes the protection of trade dress of
Internet sites difficult due to the inapplicability of the product
packaging/design distinction, as well as the Internet’s own inherent variability.
One solution may be to relax the standards of secondary meaning, to take into
account the characteristics of the Internet. However, until a trade dress cause
of action is recognized for Internet sites many courts will remain hesitant and
confused in this area of law. Clearly, commercial development of the Internet
is not likely to end merely because Internet sites are not afforded trade dress
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protection.153 However, to remain submissive on this issue may well have an
adverse impact on the commercial development of the Internet.154
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of trade dress protection is still up in unclear. There still
exists a split among the circuits about the test to apply when determining when
a product is inherently distinctive. Wal-Mart court not only failed to clarify
the issue, but also added to the confusion by making the courts determine the
difference between product design and product packaging before applying
some test. The impact of the decision in Wal-Mart has yet to be experienced.
However, it seems that only under extreme conditions will a trade dress will be
deemed inherently distinctive. As a result, only rarely will trade dress
protection be available for product design and packaging. Therefore, unless
the current state of the law changes trade dress protection will be never be
available for Internet sites.
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